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Introduction 
 
The demonstratively cordial visit of Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov to Moscow in 
early February 2008 underscored the seemingly unstoppable growth of Russia’s influence 
in Central Asia since mid-2005. The quality of this influence, however, gives ground for 
concern even among those Western experts who do not readily subscribe to the notion of 
Russia’s inherent predilection to malignant imperialism. An illustration to these concerns 
could be seen in the fact that Karimov traveled to Moscow soon after orchestrating his 
own re-election for the third term and found it opportune to express regret that President 
Vladimir Putin had not taken his advice to do the same, opting instead for installing 
Dmitri Medvedev as successor.2 Putin’s regime might appear more ‘enlightened’ that 
Karimov’s despotic rule but the fundamental compatibility between the two post-Soviet 
political systems is unmistakable, and the decision of the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-
Operation in Europe (OSCE) not to send observers to the March 2008 presidential 
elections in Russia constitutes a clear testimony of that. 
 
It is very easy to see a straight clash between this authoritarian Entente Cordiale and the 
US commitment to spreading democracy in the world, which includes a wholehearted 
support to the so-called ‘colored revolutions’. It does not, however, follow from this 
empirical evidence that the US and Russian interests in Central Asia are strictly 
confrontational, as it is sometimes argued in Washington and very often – in Moscow.3 
                                                 
2
 For a sharp commentary see Andrei Kolesnikov, ‘Islam Karimov refused to support Vladimir Putin in the 
choice of successor’, Kommersant, 7 February 2008. 
3
 An argument for a closer US-Russian cooperation in Central Asia built by Dmitri Trenin back in early 
2003 now reads like a voice in the wilderness; see Dmitri Trenin, ‘Southern Watch: Russia’s Policy in 
Central Asia’, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 56, no. 2, Spring 2003, pp. 119-131. The start of the 
Iraq war certainly made a big difference, as examined in Roy Allison, ‘Strategic Reassertion in Russia’s 
Central Asia Policy’, International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 2, March 2004, pp. 277–93; for my analysis see 
Pavel Baev, ‘Russia’s Three Petty Games in Central Asia’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 
17, no. 2, July 2004, pp. 269-283. 
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This paper aims at assessing the scope of unavoidable conflict and possible parallelism 
between these interests and will not shy away from challenging the key assumptions in 
the prevalent assessments, convincing and balanced as some of them are.  
 
A useful point of departure could be a fairly traditional dis-aggregation of both the US 
and Russian interests into three broad categories: political/ideological; economic/energy; 
and security/military. As far as the US are concerned, this elementary analytical exercise 
immediately invites the question about the wide divergence and possibly even conflict 
between these groups of interests. Svante Cornell recently argued that: ‘An approach that 
treats U.S. interests in security, energy, and governance as contradictory is a self-
fulfilling prophecy that in fact undermines each goal.’4 His bold proposition that ‘these 
contradictions are more imagined than real’ is somewhat weakened, however, by the 
plain geographic fact that US security interests are focused on Kabul and Manas, and 
energy interests – on Baku and Tengiz. This 1,000 miles gap across some very 
inhospitable territories does not necessarily imply a contradiction but does make it 
difficult to concentrate efforts and achieve synergy.5 
 
As for Russia, it is fairly obvious that this categorization of interests, while useful, is not 
sufficient, since there is also a big and diverse group of interests that, following the EU 
lingo, could be called ‘neighborhood’, while common perceptions are perhaps better 
described by the term ‘backyard’. They include various cross-border interactions and 
spillovers, as well as complicated ethno-polical issues, including the grievances of 
Russian-speaking communities, first of all in Kazakhstan, semi-legal labor migrations 
from Central Asia, particularly from Tajikistan, and also various camaraderie ties 
between elites. These interests underpin the political fact that Russia and four Central 
Asian states (minus ever-neutral Turkmenistan) are security allies, which formally makes 
it imperative for Moscow to be ready to protect these countries against both external 
challenges and domestic instabilities. Generally it means that Russia’s interests in Central 
                                                 
4
 See Svante E. Cornell, ‘Finding Balance: The Foreign Policies of Central Asian States’, pp. 267-298 in 
Ashley Tellis & Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2007-08: Domestic Political Change and Grand 
Strategy, Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2007; on p. 283. 
5
 For the Russian audience, I have argued this point in Pavel Baev, ‘Virtual Geopolitics in Central Asia: 
U.S.-Russian Cooperation vs. Conflict of Interests’, Security Index, No. 1, Spring 2008, pp. 29-36. 
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Asia are comparable with, and probably even surpass in intensity the US interests in 
Mexico. The following analysis will address each group of interests separately assuming 
that real policies are not necessarily stemming from or serving them but might have their 
own logic. 
 
Energy realities, ambitions and delusions 
 
Energy interests are supposed to be the most accurately measurable as the size of 
resources and the dynamics of production, the capacity of pipelines and the scale of 
investments are all matters for quantitative assessments that could be extrapolated with 
reasonable accuracy. Nevertheless, the breath-taking climb of oil prices since the late 
1990s has strongly deformed the mainstream interpretations of these assessments, while 
some old cliché about the ‘black gold’ being the main driving force of world politics have 
not only gained new lease on life but become enriched with new misperceptions, 
phantasms and conspiracy theories.6 
 
On the most basic level, the US energy interests consist in securing sufficient supply of 
domestic needs at the lowest possible prices. Own production can cover most of these 
needs with the crucially important exception of oil, and the immediate consequence is 
that US energy interests require reasonable stability on the world oil markets, so that the 
fundamentals of supply and demand are in balance at least for the immediate future. One 
important proposition here is that no such balance could be realistically constructed when 
the basic oil infrastructure in two major producers – Iran and Iraq – remains grossly 
underdeveloped and partially destroyed, which has been the main cause of the turmoil in 
the oil markets since the start of this decade.7 That inevitably boosts the role of the top 
                                                 
6
 One of the earlier reflections on the theme of panic in the West caused by interruptions of oil supply can 
be found in Hegré, Land of Black Gold (The Adventures of Tintin), London: Little & Brown, 1971. A 
comprehensive recent examination of the speculative spins on the energy topic is Leonardo Maugeri, The 
Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World’s Most Controversial Resource. Wespoint, 
CT: Praeger, 2006.  
7
 The International Energy Agency (IEA) is cautious in evaluating the prospects for normalization on the 
market, predicting that oil production in the Middle East will increase from 24.1 million barrels per day in 
2006 to 27.5 in 2010 and 31.8 in 2015. See World Energy Outlook 2007, OECD/IEA, Paris: 2007, p. 82.  
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exporter with significant reserve capacity – Saudi Arabia, but also elevates the 
importance of secondary producers far beyond their modest reserves. 
 
This return to the basics helps to take a fresh look at the US energy interests in Central 
Asia and discover that they are entirely concentrated in North-Western Kazakhstan and 
are aimed at maximizing production at its oilfields, particularly off-shore, and securing 
safe and economical delivery of this oil to the world market. Diversification of supply has 
for decades been an important (even if somewhat academic) secondary element of US oil 
interests, but it would be impractical indeed to aim at organizing deliveries from 
Kazakhstan. One immediate conclusion from this most abbreviated analysis is that the 
flow of oil from Kazakhstan to China thorough the recently launched and currently 
expanded Atyrau (Guriev)-Atasu-Alashankou pipeline serves US interests perfectly 
well.8 Another conclusion, heretical as it may seem, is that the export of Kazakh oil to 
and via Iran, currently limited to swap deals and small-scale tanker traffic to the Neka oil 
port, is perfectly compatible with the US energy interests.9   
 
The key question about the Kazakh oil is whether its transportation predominantly 
through Russia constitutes any kind of problem for the US energy interests. Dozens of 
analysis take an affirmative answer to this question as self-evident despite the evidence 
amassed since 2001, but an impartial examination of this ‘axiom’ would inevitably 
conclude that it does not hold water. Even in the period of scandalously low oil prices at 
the end of the previous decade, Russia was very reluctant to enter into an arrangement 
with the OPEC on production cuts.10 Since then, Moscow has been consistently trying to 
built a reputation of a reliable supplier that stays clear from the intrigues between 
                                                 
8
 One clear examination is James Fishelson, ‘From the Silk Road to Chevron: The Geopolitics of Oil 
Pipelines in Central Asia’, Vestnik, No. 7, 12 December 2007 
(http://www.sras.org/geopolitics_of_oil_pipelines_in_central_asia); see also Stephen Blank, ‘China’s 
recent energy gains in Central Asia: What do they portend’, CACI Analyst, 31 October 2007 
(http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4726).  
9
 On Kazakhstan’s interest in constructing a pipeline from Neka to the Gulf, see Elena Butyrina, 
‘Kazakhstan could partake in the Iranian pipeline project’, Panorama, 29 February 2008 
(http://panorama.vkkz.com/index.php?option=com_wrapper&Itemid=66). 
10
 It could be noted that in the debates during winter 2001/2002 it was Yukos led by Mikhail Khodorkovsky 
that was firmly against any deals of this sort, while Lukoil was more positively inclined; see Yuri 
Aleksandrov & Dmitry Orlov, ‘OPEC or Russia?’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 February 2002. 
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producers and consumers, and lifted any objections against the BTC project. The collapse 
of the Russia-US ‘energy dialogue’ has not changed this line that was drawn with 
particular emphasis during the year of Russia’s chairmanship in the G8 in 2006.11 
Building ties with Saudi Arabia and Venezuela in 2007, Moscow demonstratively 
ignored invitations to join OPEC.12 
 
Whatever desperate decisions might be taken in the Kremlin in the fairly possible 
situation of a new sharp drop in the oil prices, perhaps driven by a ‘war’ between 
producers, it is plain inconceivable that it might opt for interrupting the export from 
Kazakhstan. President Nursultan Nazarbaev, a true gross-master in playing the ‘multiple-
vectors’ game, had measured every risk, cost and benefit before assuring Putin in May 
2007 that he was ‘absolutely committed to transporting most if not all of its hydrocarbons 
through Russian territory.’13 Indeed, Kazakhstan’s key role in the transit of natural gas 
from Turkmenistan to Russia provides it an absolute security guarantee against any 
hypothetic surprises, like the closure of the Tengiz-Novorossiisk pipeline for an 
unscheduled repair. For that matter, the delays in development the giant off-shore 
Kashagan oil field in Kazakhstan – that are clearly against US interests – have been 
caused by the sharp conflict between Astana and the consortium of Western ‘majors’ led 
by Italian ENI – but that conflict was not triggered or in any way instigated by Moscow.14 
 
Several important implications follow from the simple point that transportation of 
Kazakh oil through Russia does not constitute a challenge to US energy interests. One is 
that the channeling of this oil towards the Primorsk terminal might constitute a problem 
due to heavy tanker traffic in the congested Gulf of Finland, particularly in the decision 
                                                 
11
 Upbeat presentation of this dialogue can be found in ‘US-Russia Commercial Energy Summit’, Baker 
Institute Study No. 21, February 2003 (http://bakerinstitute.org/Pubs/study_21.pdf). On the ‘Global Energy 
Security Action Plan’ approved at the July 2006 G8 Strelna summit, see Dmitri Butrin, ‘The three-mice 
summit’, Kommersant, 18 July 2006. 
12
 See Sergei Kulikov, ‘We want a different OPEC’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 March 2008. 
13
 See Arkady Dubnov, ‘Where the Caspian Sea flows in’, Vremya novostei, 11 May 2007; my comment is 
Pavel Baev, ‘Putin’s double triumph not yet in the bag’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 14 May 2007 
(http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372161). 
14
 See on that Sergei Smirnov, ‘Kashagan’s multiple dots’, Expert Kazakhstan, 28 January 2008 
(http://expert.ru/printissues/kazakhstan/2008/04/razrabotka_kashagana/). 
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on BTS-2 is taken by the new Putin government;15 to the contrary, the recently contracted 
construction of the Burgas-Alexandroupolis by-pass pipeline around the Bosporus is 
perfectly fine, and the loudly voiced reservations against this project are simply 
manifestations of parochial ‘special interests’.16 Another implication is that Washington 
could find it useful to express support for constructing the second line of the Tengiz-
Novorossiisk pipeline by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), much the same way as 
it did at the launch of the first line of this project back in 2001. The CPC is split by a 
protracted conflict between partners, and a bit of external help might make significant 
difference in widening this economically sensible route.17 Yet another point is that the 
much-debated option for transportation of the Kazakh oil via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline may be not that important after all, particularly since Azerbaijan now 
claims that it has enough oil to fill this ‘strategic’ pipe for up to ten years.18 Finally, it 
could be suggested that discussion of these matters, as well as prospects for developing 
the hydrocarbon resources of the Arctic, could shape a useful agenda for the revived US-
Russian energy dialogue. 
 
Moscow could be reluctant to debate in this potentially helpful framework problems and 
prospects for its natural gas import from Central Asia since that constitutes its truly vital 
energy interest, unlike oil where its interests are limited to securing transit profits and 
setting joint ventures for developing cross-border mixed jurisdiction fields. The stagnant 
production on the major Siberian gasfields controlled by Gazprom and the steady growth 
of internal demand create the situation of ‘gas crunch’, which is certain to continue for 
the near-term, so importing some 60-70 bcm from Turkmenistan and 10-15 bcm from 
                                                 
15
 On the protracted clash of interest groups around the Baltic Pipeline System (BTS) see Dmitri Butrin, 
‘Transneft cannot connect a pipe with a port’, Kommersant, 5 May 2008. 
16
 See for example, Vladimir Socor, ‘The first Russian-operated pipeline of European Union territory rears 
its head’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2 March 2007 
(http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371965).  
17
 Western companies who have stakes in CPC are also involved in the oil production in Tengiz, and so are 
interested in lowest possible tariffs, while Transneft that has a minority stake in CPC insists on raising 
them. Because of low tariffs, the CPC has never been able to make any operational profit and is burdened 
with heavy debt, which has to be restructured. See Lydmila Podobedova, ‘Chevron gives five years to the 
CPC’, RBC Daily, 22 April 2008; Dmitri Verhoturov, ‘The CPC is not ready for expansion’, Expert-
Kazakhstan, 1 October 2007 (http://expert.ru/printissues/kazakhstan/2007/36/problemy_ktk/).  
18
 Sergei Mahnovsky argued that Tengiz is so important for this pipeline that it should be re-named TBTC, 
see Olga Oliker & Thomas Szayna (eds), Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus, RAND, 
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Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is absolutely necessary for delivering on Russia’s export 
commitments. That fact of energy life cannot lead to the conclusion that the decisive 
‘victory’ achieved by President Putin through the agreements with Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in May 2006 (detailed further in documents signed in 
December-January) signifies a ‘defeat’ for the US in the imaginary ‘Great Caspian 
Energy Game’.19  
 
There has never been any serious US interest involved with the phantasmagoric project 
for building a gas pipeline across Afghanistan and into Pakistan.20 There is a hard-driven 
lobby in Washington that advocates the design for a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline seeking 
to replay the BTC success story; however, even their best efforts cannot establish an 
economic rationale for this project or connect it with US energy interests. The attempts to 
explain to the ‘short-sighted’ EU what are the risks and opportunities for its fledgling 
energy strategy resemble rather tellingly the US-European disagreements about importing 
Soviet gas in the early years of the Reagan era.21 Entertaining as it may be to spin such 
daring enterprises (and this author has taken part in quite a few of such brainstorms), it is 
essential to remember that they do constitute an assault on Russia’s vital interests, which 
does not mean that they should be banned or censored but implies that the consequences 
should be fully taken into account. The ‘cooperation-&-conflict’ model performs poorly 
for an actor that is eager to challenge vital interests of the counter-part for the benefit of 
own peripheral interests – and then expects cooperation in the areas where own vital 
interests are at stake. 
 
                                                 
19
 See Kirill Martynov, ‘The price of the victory’, Kommersant, 26 June 2007; on the appointment of a 
special energy ambassador in the US State Department, see Vladimir Skosyrev, ‘A new US challenge to 
Russia’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 15 February 2008.  
20
 For a reasonable assessment of energy developments in South Asia see Stephen Blank, ‘Caspian Basin: 
A look at the Southern factor in the regional energy equation’, Eurasia Insight, 29 November 2007 
(http://eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav112907a.shtml). 
21
 See, for instance, Zeyno Baran, ‘EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage’, Washington 
Quarterly, Autumn 2007, pp. 131-144; Vladimir Socor, ‘Playing catch-up with Russia on Caspian energy 
transit’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 7 June 2007 (http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372213). 
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Enjoying regime stability while it lasts          
 
The ‘orange’ revolution in Ukraine in late 2004 did not impress the Central Asian 
‘presidents-for-life’ as much as the Kremlin that was shell-shocked by the cheerful 
crowds on the maidan; the collapse of Askar Akaev’s regime in Kyrgyzstan in early 
2005, however, brought them in much the same frame of mind. In retrospect, that small 
and suddenly successful street revolt looks very different from the democracy-inspired 
uprisings in Kiev, Tbilisi or, for that matter, Belgrade, and so hardly deserves the name of 
‘Tulip revolution’.22 In the panic-stricken ranks of kakistocracy (as William Safire 
poignantly defined the post-Soviet elites), there was hardly any doubt, however, that it 
was yet another hit in the seemingly unstoppable chain reaction, particularly since the 
demonstration effect was quite evident. While Moscow was absorbed by introspection, 
the next test came up in Uzbekistan – and President Islam Karimov opted for a forceful 
response taking personal responsibility for the ‘shoot-to-kill’ order in Andijan.23    
 
That tragic event erected a clear-cut watershed in the Central Asian geopolitical 
dynamics. The US administration and the European governments were compelled to 
condemn the massacre – and that stance was taken by Karimov and every other ‘strong 
leader’, including perhaps even freshman Ilham Aliyev in Azerbaijan, not only as undue 
interference in internal affairs but also as evidence of involvement in pro-active 
destabilization policies aimed at staging a series of Georgia-type ‘regime changes’.24 
Russia took a diametrically opposite approach and instantly expressed unambiguous 
support for Karimov’s actions shielding him from international sanctions and providing 
credibility for his version of a ‘terrorist attack’. In just a few months time, an armed 
uprising in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria was suppressed with the same resolute force, 
                                                 
22
 One good analysis is Erika Marat, The Tulip Revolution: Kyrgyzstan One Year After, Washington DC: 
Jamestown Foundation, April 2006; the astonishing lack of self-defense is reflected in ‘Bloodless Coup a 
Real Letdown’, The Onion, 16 February 2005 (http://www.theonion.com/content/node/30906).  
23
 My reading of this controversial event is close to the findings of the report ‘Uzbekistan: The Andijon 
Uprising’, Asia Briefing No. 38, Brussels: International Crisis Group, 25 May 2005 
(http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3469&l=1).  
24
 Sharp criticism of that ‘miscalculation’ by Washington is elaborated in John Daly, Kurt Meppen, 
Vladimir Socor, and Frederick Starr, Anatomy of a Crisis: U.S.-Uzbekistan Relations, 2001-2005, Silk 
Road paper, Washington: CACI & SRSP, Johns Hopkins-SAIS, February 2006. 
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cementing the newly-forged affinity between Russia and Uzbekistan.25 Karimov certainly 
understood that Russia’s embrace was far from charitable but he was so outraged by 
subversive Western demarche that burning political bridges did not seem a step too far – 
and the US Kharsi-Khanabad (K2) airbase was expelled.   
 
Moscow saw that forced US withdrawal as a decisive success of its post-September 2001 
policy of regaining the lost positions in Central Asia and proceeded with upgrading and 
reformatting of the overlapping multilateral structures, first of all the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO).26 One characteristic feature of these low-content 
organizations is the lack of any meaningful cooperation between the Central Asian states 
as all networking was centered on Moscow. Another feature is the rather advanced 
socializing of security elites for whom Russia continues to be the role model and norm-
setter, while business elites tend to expand their horizons wider and cultivate ties with 
Turkey, China, and the EU that erode the attractiveness of the Russian model.  
 
The sudden departure in the last days of 2006 of President Sapurmurat Niyazov, who had 
taken the principle of ‘neutralism’ to such extreme as reducing Turkmenistan’s 
involvement in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to the status of 
‘observer’, has made it possible for Russia to add a new and really functional dimension 
to its ‘integrationist’ policy. Instead of playing with such hollow shells as the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEC), Moscow has focused on building an ‘energy axis’ 
connecting Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, with Uzbekistan as the significant other.27 
While there is still no formal framework for this ‘gas alliance’, the series of meetings 
between its ‘founding fathers’ in 2007-2008 has produced more tangible results (in terms 
of agreements on volumes and prices and pipeline deals) than great many high-level 
conferences on the stumbling and struggling EU energy policy.  
 
                                                 
25
 See Georgi Derluguian, ‘Nalchik as the Russian Andijan’, Izvestia, 18 October 2005. 
26
 On the earlier guidelines of this policy, see Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping 
of Russian Foreign Policy. London: I. B. Tauris, 2004. 
27
 My ‘road-map’ for this process was sketched in Pavel K. Baev, ‘Turning Counter-Terrorism into 
Counter-Revolution: Russia Focuses on Kazakhstan and Engages Turkmenistan’, European Security, vol. 
15, no.1, March 2006, pp. 3–22. For a current analysis, see Tatyana Stanovaya, ‘Russian builds an Asian 
energy alliance’, Politcom.ru, 14 May 2007 (http://politcom.ru/article.php?id=4555). 
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This string of successes that Russia has scored presents a difficult dilemma for the US 
that has to find a common denominator for its criticism of the consistent curtailing of 
democracy by President Putin (including the tight management of the succession process) 
and its readiness to cultivate relations with Central Asian leaders, despite their 
pronounced drift towards tougher authoritarianism. While the conflict with Karimov was 
beyond reconciliation for a couple of years after the K2 closure, it was President 
Nazarbaev who constituted the natural focus of US attention, first of all because of his 
key role in the shifting (and quite possibly, misconstrued) balances of power in energy 
geopolitics. The trip of US Vice President Dick Cheney in May 2006 illuminated that 
dilemma: In Vilnius, he delivered a powerful speech in support of democratic reforms 
and revolutions with a strong warning to Russia not to wander from the path of 
democratization, and then in Astana, he gave thumbs up to Nazarbaev and confirmed that 
as far as Washington was concerned his extermination of any political opposition was 
perfectly fine. As a result, the Russian leadership and most mainstream commentators 
interpreted the Vilnius speech as an exercise in hostile ideological politics, and even the 
New Your Times felt obliged to emphasize in an editorial: ‘And however hypocritical 
Cheney might be in lecturing anyone about human rights - especially just before heading 
off to court President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, hardly a paragon of civic 
virtue - that does not mean he was wrong.’28  
 
The new US line drawn with, as one sharp comment pointed out, an ‘increased awareness 
that its democracy project ran into the sand and was terribly counterproductive in Central 
Asia’, was more effectual in Kazakhstan, where Nazarbaev felt reassured that no 
revolutions were plotted against him.29 More reassurances were provided during his visit 
to Washington in September 2006, but it was still impossible not to see that the US 
leadership expected to see changes in the regime character, if not a ‘regime change’, in 
                                                 
28
 See ‘Criticizing Russia with good reason’, New York Times, July 1-2, 2006. One typical sample in the 
avalanche of commentary in Moscow is Aleksandr Privalov, ‘On the speech of Vice President Cheney’, 
Expert, 8 May 2006.  
29
 See Stephen J. Blank, ‘America strikes back? Geopolitical rivalry in Central Asia and the Caucasus’, 
CACI Analyst, 17 May 2006 (http://cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=4233&SMSESSION=NO).  
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the direction that went strictly across Nazarbaev’s preferences.30 A confirmation of the 
continuing US moral support for political forces seen as intrinsically hostile by the 
Central Asian rulers was unmistakable in President Bush’s address to the UN General 
Assembly in September 2007, and the point was not that he mixed up Kazakhstan with 
Kyrgyzstan – but that he ‘saluted’ the latter among other ‘nations that have recently taken 
strides toward liberty’, including Georgia and Ukraine, despite the clear authoritarian 
backsliding in Bishkek.31    
 
The gap between the intention to pursue a pragmatic course in ‘befriending’ Nazarbaev 
and since 2007 Berdymuhammedov as well, and the desire to uphold a principled stance 
on promoting democracy can hardly be bridged in the US policy, while Russia capitalizes 
on the counter-revolutionary and anti-democratic coherence between its foreign and 
domestic policies. For that matter, Moscow saw no problem whatsoever supporting 
Kazakhstan’s ambitious bid to assume the chairmanship in the OSCE, while the US and 
the key European states granted only conditional consent for the year 2010.32 Pleased as 
he was with the trip to Washington, Nazarbaev had a meeting with Putin immediately 
after it, where lucrative energy deals were penned, to be followed by more business 
conducted in the ‘most favored’ regime in May and December 2007.  
 
Putin’s success is secured not by his commitment to ‘pragmatism’ (that could perhaps be 
better described as ‘opportunism’) but by the increasingly pronounced preaching of a 
different ideology that is often labeled ‘sovereignty’ for the lack of a better term. Russia 
portrays itself as a model of economic success and social cohesion achieved without 
advancing democratic reforms and implanting Western values – and Central Asian 
leaders feel comfortable with this leadership. They have few doubts subscribing to the 
argument that support for democracy and human rights is just ‘a veneer of clamorous 
rhetoric’ covering up the ‘attempts to impose unfair competition on us and secure access 
                                                 
30
 An insightful reflection on this high-profile visit is Marat Yermukanov, ‘Nazarbaev’s Washington trip 
wins him praise, mutes criticism at home’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 6 October 2006 
(http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371523). 
31
 On Bush’s UN address see Andrei Terehov, ‘Bush organized a democracy day’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 
September 2007. 
32
 See on that Vladimir Socor, ‘Kazakhstan to chair the OSCE: Splitting the Russia-led bloc?’, Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, 6 December 2007 (http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372645). 
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to our resources,’ as Putin asserted in the not-farewell speech in February 2008.33 There 
is, nevertheless, a shaky premise and a serious flaw in this meeting of minds that are all 
set on the assumption that the ruling regimes could be made indefinitely stable. The 
premise is that Putin’s scheme for stepping down from the summit of power without 
releasing the grasp on it would indeed work, and the flaw is that the minion-despots 
remain in denial of the plain fact that the ‘suzerain’ Russia has neither capacity nor 
intention to provide any meaningful security guarantees. 
 
Security takes care of itself, but for how long?  
 
It appears almost supernatural that in the three years since the Andijan uprising, Central 
Asia has not faced a single noteworthy big-impact security challenge. Tightly managed 
elections came and went with barely a ripple (protests in Kyrgyzstan after the 
parliamentary elections in December 2007 could qualify as one but only just), terrorist 
attacks were rare and inconsequential (like the explosion near the presidential palace in 
Dushanbe in November 2007 that claimed one life), and even the sudden death of 
President Niyazov in December 2006 did not trigger any violent clan struggle that had 
appeared very probable.34 Strong economic growth has perhaps taken the edge from the 
most acute social problems, like poverty and unemployment, but most chronic problems, 
like the shortage of arable land and water, have not subsided, while new hardships, like 
the extremely cold winter 2008 in Tajikistan, appear all the time.   
 
The on-going lull in conflict transformation is, therefore, not that easy to explain, and 
while it has certain parallelism with stabilization in the North Caucasus (partial and 
uncertain as it is), it stands in sharp contrast with the steady escalation of violence in 
Afghanistan. There is no space here to examine the trajectory of this ever-evolving 
multiple-actors civil war, but some of its fronts inevitably have – and perhaps could have 
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 My reflections on that address are in Pavel Baev, ‘Putin warns against “immoral” Western interference in 
his “strategic” speech’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 11 February 2008 
(http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372792). 
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 For a perceptive analysis, see ‘Cracks in the Marble: Turkmenistan’s Failing Dictatorship’, Asia Briefing 
44, Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 2003 
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had far more – impact on the security situation in Central Asia. One impact that is 
significant in its absence is the broken connection with the Islamist/terrorist networks in 
the Fergana valley, as the revival of the Taliban has not so far brought any resurgence of 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).35 Neither has the regrouping of the Tajik 
tribal forces around the Panjshir valley generated any destabilizing cross-border spillover 
that could threaten to restart the civil war in Tajikistan that Russia with great effort 
helped to bring to an end back in 1996-1997. 
 
Whatever ideas about the threat of ‘geopolitical encirclement’ are fabricated and spun in 
Moscow, there are hardly any doubts in the Kremlin that for the US and for NATO as 
well the travail of the peace-enforcement/state-building operation in Afghanistan is a 
matter of top priority.36 The Russian leadership may have a slightly exaggerated 
assessment of how crucial was the support provided to the US in autumn 2001 for 
achieving the swift and decisive victory over the Taliban, but its course towards reducing 
this support, including discontinuing the military aid to the Karzai government, to the 
point of non-involvement has not made much of a difference. It is clear that a serious 
Russian contribution to the efforts of the international coalition could have had a 
profound effect, but it is equally clear that such a contribution is not in the cards.  
 
Moscow certainly does not want to be seen as a ‘spoiler’, and in principle it is not 
interested in a failure of the US-led intervention, heart-warming as such a prospect might 
seem for many neo-anti-Americanists. The consequences of such a defeat are too 
dangerous to contemplate, so the preferred option for the Kremlin is a protracted civil 
war that would keep NATO entangled in performing a resource-consuming but ultimately 
hopeless task. Working towards such an option, Russia is carefully cultivating ties with 
old and new allies in Afghanistan fostering the National Front that brings together 
regional political forces (first of all the Tajiks and the Uzbeks) and the remnants of the 
                                                 
35
 The complex structure of current conflict is examined in Antonio Guistozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and 
Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. London: Hurst, 2007.   
36
 One sound analysis is Vladimir Ovchinsky, ‘Afghanistan without the coalition’, Russia in Global Affairs, 
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Parcham and Khalq factions.37 Gentle pressure is periodically applied on the Manas 
airbase in order to remind the US that the possibility of using this crucially important 
channel depends entirely on Moscow’s goodwill. The April 2008 NATO summit in 
Bucharest provided for Putin an opportunity to emphasize the vulnerability of the 
coalition operation (‘Can this be done effectively without Russia? No.’), while offering 
only limited help in supplying the Alliance’s forces.38   
 
The spiraling destabilization of political situation in Pakistan provides evidence for the 
argument that the building of a functional state in Afghanistan requires in the mid-term a 
great increase of trade and other ties with its other neighbors, including those to the 
North. That might lead to a geopolitical reformatting of the whole Greater Central Asia 
region as suggested by several scholars who look for common-sense solutions beyond the 
current military impasse.39 These ideas are not very popular in Moscow as they look 
suspiciously like provocations against its growing influence; what is more significant, 
they are not warmly welcomed in Central Asian capitals either. Odd as that might seem, 
Afghanistan in 2005-2006 was the most democratic state in the region, and for Messrs 
Karimov and Rakhmonov the propositions about open competition between political 
forces and reasonably free elections seemed far more dangerous than any Islamic 
propaganda mastered by the Taliban. The ties between Afghanistan and its northern 
neighbors have therefore been cut down as far as possible, and the very reserved attitude 
towards expanding relations with Iran (demonstrated even by Berdymuhammedov) adds 
to the fact that Central Asia remains essentially closed in the southern direction. 
 
                                                 
37
 See on that Dmitri Verhoturov, ‘Another Afghanistan’, Expert, (in Russian) 11 June 2007 
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There is, nevertheless, one important and hugely worrisome exception to that picture of 
sealed-off borders – drug-trafficking. Its has been obvious for years that there is a great 
promise in constructive cooperation between Russia, the US and the EU aimed at 
reducing the opium production in Afghanistan and the heroin flow via Central Asia 
towards Russia and Europe. Yet it is also obvious that this cooperation has hit a dead-
end.40 NATO and the US are understandably concerned that a pro-active policy against 
poppy cultivation might endanger their current operations and so do only as little as 
absolutely necessary in checking the explosive growth of heroin production, essentially 
condemning the Afghan state-building project to failure. Russia, from its side, prefers to 
ignore the transformation of Tajikistan into a drug-trafficking state where law 
enforcement structures provide protection for smugglers, and takes no notice of the 
absence of any functioning central governance in Southern Kyrgyzstan that threatens to 
break the state apart.41 The scale of the drugs-related problems in Russia itself is typically 
denied, but the lack of attention to the fast-growing security challenges driven by the 
expanding heroin economy in the two states where its military bases are located is still 
astounding. 
 
Russia is not building any military capabilities that could be useful for deterring and 
countering security threats in Central Asia, in contrast to the developments in the North 
Caucasus, where the reduction of armed violence goes in parallel with deployment of 
new combat-capable units. Most of these units, including two newly-raised mountain 
brigades that were deployed in Dagestan and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya during 2007, have 
limited mobility and cannot be quickly transported to remote theaters like, for instance, 
Tajikistan. Doing as little as possible in building power-projection capabilities aimed at 
Central Asia, Moscow puts a lot of spin on the activities of security organizations, 
advertising the non-existent peacekeeping forces of the CSTO and persistently proposing 
it as the best possible partner for NATO in Afghanistan.42  
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The most celebrated structure is certainly the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
which has attracted so much attention in the current commentary since staging the 
unprecedented Russian-Chinese military exercises in the Urals in August 2007 that there 
is hardly any need in adding one more opinion.43 It may still be worth pointing out that 
the ‘Peace Mission 2007’ has revealed as many hidden tensions between China and 
Russia (including Moscow’s concerns about Beijing’s expressed readiness to partake in 
military exercises in Central Asia) as it has demonstrated unity and common purpose. 
The sharp contraction of Russian arms export to China adds to the evidence for the 
proposition that the bilateral military cooperation has peaked. 
 
Overall, Russia has apparently developed a habit of presenting itself as a ‘security 
guarantor’ for Central Asia without investing any significant resources in building the 
necessary capabilities for this role. The underlying assumption could only be that the 
intensity of external and intra-regional security challenges would remain low, no matter 
what happens in Afghanistan, so the low-cost ‘good-weather’ arrangements would 
suffice. The ‘economization’ of Russia’s security policy in Central Asia, with the prime 
attention on the energy-rich Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and the secondary focus on 
Uzbekistan, may be a perfectly sound approach, but it leaves unaddressed the progressive 
deterioration of security in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which might result in a spectacular 
state failure.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The prospects for US-Russian interactions in Central Asia are in many ways dependent 
upon, if not determined by, the necessary revision of aims and priorities in the US policy 
towards Russia. Such a thorough review was in the cards at the start of George W. Bush’s 
second presidential term but was apparently abandoned as too complicated or perhaps 
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bothersome – and so would have to be done by the new president and her/his team.44 The 
pattern of US-Russian relation has in the meanwhile de-facto shifted from ‘partnership’ 
(based on one fateful ‘look-in-the-eye’) to ‘cooperation-competition’. There are many 
good reasons for changing this pattern even further towards ‘cooperation-competition-
confrontation’, where ‘competition’ would be the main working mode applied wherever 
possible, while ‘cooperation’ is maintained where useful, and ‘confrontation’ is carried 
through where necessary. The problem with such a change is that encroachments on 
Russia’s vital interests, entertaining as they might be, could generate such tensions that it 
would become problematic to preserve cooperation in areas where Washington finds it 
essential and desirable. A more promising and practical pattern could be ‘partnership-
cooperation-competition-confrontation’, where ‘partnership’ is defined as ideal mode and 
cultivated where it is sustainable (for instance, in space exploration), while ‘cooperation’ 
is pursued where possible (prioritizing non-proliferation), ‘competition’ – where 
necessary, and ‘confrontation’ – where unavoidable. Nothing in this analysis suggests 
that Central Asia might fall in the latter category.    
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